INTRODUCTION
In his recent book The Stalin Cult, Jan Plamper notes the importance of "contradistinction"-a concept used most often in the field of marketing-in the making of many mid-twentieth-century personality cults. Cults constructed around figures such as Stalin often incorporated attempts to deliberately contrast their objects of veneration with their rivals. This was manifest in the visual realm, in particular, where depictions of individual leaders were often created in direct contrast to those of their contemporaries. For example, "Stalin's pipe," argues Plamper, "…was deliberately set off against the bourgeois cigar in general, and eventually against Churchill's cigar in particular.
Roosevelt's optimistic, white-toothed smile … was in deliberate contrast to Hitler's brooding, gothic countenance."1 Recent work on Mussolini suggests that this scenario is also known to historians of modern Europe; Christopher Duggan has shown, for instance, how the origins of the Mussolini personality cult can be traced to fascists' attempts to set their hero apart from Italy's liberal leaders in the 1920s. 2 In writing on China the concept has been employed, though not articulated as "contradistinction," most often with reference to the cult of Mao Zedong. This can be seen in recent work by Daniel Leese, who, building on similar observations made decades earlier by scholars such as Raymond Wylie, has examined how modern China's most pervasive personality cult emerged out of a wartime desire on the part of Mao to emulate, but also set himself CSSH 57-3 Taylor 2 apart from, Chiang Kai-shek. 3 The now burgeoning literature on the cultural history of China under Japanese occupation has started to revisit the wartime cults of other leaders,such as the much-maligned Chinese collaborationist leader Wang Jingwei. Several scholars studying Wang have moved beyond the biographical approaches that epitomized earlier studies4 to explore the political culture Wang fostered through his "Re-organized National Government (RNG) of China," from 1940 to 1945,including a distinct personality cult that was created around Wang himself. David P. Barrett, in the most succinct summary of this cult, described how, "Innumerable editions of Wang's articles and speeches were published; Ministry [of Propaganda] journalists followed Wang on his travels…, and major dates on the regime's calendar were celebrated in the towns and cities with meetings and march-pasts lauding the leader. Photographs of Wang in the press far eclipsed those of his subordinates. "5 Yet to be fully explored is the extent to which this wartime adulation of Wang represented not merely a part of collaborationist state building, but a conscious attempt to undermine, and set Wang apart from, his primary rival Chiang Kai-shek. Much has been written about their decades-long personal rivalry.6 My aim here is to explore how the Wang cult that developed under the RNG was in many ways an exercise in contradistinction. As will become clear, attempts to distance Wang from Chiang not only influenced how Wang was presented but also how those around him justified his leadership of a rival government. We will see that such contradistinction also led Wang's government into a series of symbolic contortions toward the end of the war, when new allegiances and dynamics began to undermine the very notion of "peace" upon which Wang's regime had been rhetorically founded.
Beyond this, I will put forward a number of claims about the general nature of personality cults under the Japanese occupation. My first claim is that veneration of Wang Jingwei during CSSH 57-3 Taylor 3 occupation needs to be studied in a more objective manner than it has been, in the same way that cults constructed around other "puppet leaders" are now being revisited, a comparison to which I will return in my conclusion. I will argue that we need to reconceptualize "collaborationist" personality cults and reconsider the way in which they have been cast as mere wartime aberrations.
Secondly, I shall explore how the peculiar circumstances of collaboration, in China and elsewhere, create a particular type of leader worship, one that is sometimes more understated and modest than that embodied in cults created around leaders who are remembered as champions of "resistance."
It is regarding this second point that the concept of contradistinction becomes clearest, for as we shall see, by setting themselves against those that they have replaced, collaborationist leaders tend to construct a public image that is consciously less authoritarian than we might expect. Such contradistinction can only develop up to a point, however, since the leaders that are the focus of personality cults produced under occupation ultimately survive at the whim of the occupiers. That such regimes rely upon an external force often leads to confused or conflicting narratives about collaborationist leaders, and this ultimately undermines any legitimacy that such regimes might have initially claimed.
THE JAPANESE INVASION AND THE CHIANG KAI-SHEK CULT
Much of the scholarship on the Chiang Kai-shek cult has emphasized the Nanjing Decade (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) as the crucial period in the construction of a public image around Chiang.7 It was during this era that many "cult products"8-portraiture, laudatory publications, statues-began to be manufactured and that Chiang's supporters most forcefully called upon the legacy of Sun Yat-sen to justify Chiang's status as the symbolic leader (though not head of state) of Nationalist China.9
However, my perusal of nearly all of the official propaganda produced in the months following the 1937 Japanese invasion suggests that the Chiang cult took on a decidedly new vigor CSSH 57-3 Taylor 4 in wartime. The general themes of patriotism and resistance are certainly important to understanding how the Republican state responded to war in 1937, and they have been thoroughly documented. But it is clear that party and state bodies devoted tremendous energy to calling for unreserved loyalty to Chiang (equating this with loyalty to China itself) and in redefining the Chiang cult to correspond with wartime realities. In the "Salvationist" press, Chiang's role in leading military defense emerged as a prominent feature of wartime reportage.10 As one Guangzhou-based editor of Chiang's wartime speeches phrased it in February 1938: "All those who resist the Japanese must profess to 'protect the supreme commander, Chairman Chiang' (yonghu zuigao lingxiu Jiang Weiyuanzhang). Anyone who opposes this [principle] will be seen by all the people as a traitor and will be vigorously attacked. Those who profess to protect [the supreme leader], must not take this merely as a slogan, but must remember the leader's orders, follow their guidance in everything they do, and never waiver."11
The elevation of Chiang to the status of not simply a military commander but the embodiment of resistance sparked an explosion of often-radical propaganda that drew on earlier representations of him as a military leader. This was most apparent in the work of the Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission (PDMAC; Junshi Weiyuanhui Zhengzhibu). This arm of the Nationalist state, restructured in January 1938, was managed by intellectuals such as Guo Moruo, but included artists of diverse political persuasions.12 The PDMAC remolded Chiang through posters, leaflets, movies, and print publications that called for total war against the Japanese, and raised Chiang to levels of veneration not witnessed during the Nanjing years. Of particular importance to the PDMAC's image of Chiang was his role in the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928, when he claimed to have defeated the warlords and created a unified Republican state.
At the twelfth anniversary of the expedition's launch in June 1938 the PDMAC published hagiographic booklets that suggested, among other things, that patriots might like to send CSSH 57-3 Taylor 5 congratulatory messages to Chiang.13 At other times, it republished and distributed Northern Expedition-era texts about Chiang, and celebrated his role in unifying China and defeating foreign imperialism a decade before the Japanese invasion.14 The PDMAC's visual representations of Chiang were similarly stark and militarized, and betrayed the influence of European fascist propaganda. Chiang was presented only in military uniform, with his face often superimposed above anonymous Nationalist soldiers. His images usually struck a combative pose, often while in the throes of oratory. He rarely smiled (figures 1 and 2).
Tellingly, the production and distribution of this image of Chiang was not limited to the PDMAC or even to the Nationalists per se; leftist artists who had risked imprisonment prior to 1937 for their caricatures of Chiang spent the early months of the war rendering flattering images of him for propaganda purposes.15 As Lyman van Slyke has noted, the very nature of the United Front determined that "Communist propaganda organs praised Chiang … and proclaimed their determination to resist to the end beside the Central Government…."16 In late December 1938, a "Protect Chairman Chiang Rally" was held in the de facto communist capital of Yan'an,17 and in communist base areas his portraits were often hung beside those of Mao Zedong and Sun Yat-sen (figure 3).
As this reference to Sun Yat-sen suggests, the early wartime promotion of Chiang differed from that propagated during the Nanjing Decade in another key respect: Expressions of fealty to Sun and his 1911 revolution had been a central platform of the KMT Chiang cult in the 1920s and 1930s, when they were used to highlight Chiang's claims to legitimacy. The construction of the monumental Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing in the late 1920s and its transformation into "one of the most sacred sites in modern Chinese history" is but one example, and it laid the foundation for what some have called a "spatial link" between Sun and the city of Nanjing. 18 The cult of This shift was most tangible in the wartime rewriting of laws on the production, distribution, and use of Chiang's image and name. While such laws had existed from the early years of the Nanjing Decade and had been observed within the ranks of the Nationalist Party, many were reinforced on a national scale in 1938. In July of that year the Executive Yuan promulgated new regulations that specified precise ways and contexts in which portraits of the zongcai (lit. "director general"-i.e., Chiang) and the chairman of the National Government were to be hung in government offices. Later rules designated how Chiang was to be referred to in writing.22
This institutionalization of the Chiang cult was partly a direct response to the hurried production of Chiang imagery and texts in the weeks and months after war broke out, when CSSH 57-3 Taylor 7 urgency compromised the unity of the message that groups such as the PDMAC promoted. A cynical interpretation might suggest that such regulations were an opportunistic effort by Chiang and those around him to stifle the factional divisions that had plagued the KMT before 1937 and bring the cult to a truly national audience.
In any case, by the time Chiang's armies arrived in the city of Chongqing in late 1938, and despite various military setbacks that had befallen the Nationalist state, Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed a public persona in "Free China," and an ability to determine and control that persona, that greatly surpassed with the hagiographic representations created around him just a few years before. In Chongqing, Western observers noted with some incredulity that his supporters now saw him as "almost superhuman."23 THE EMERGENCE OF THE WARTIME WANG JINGWEI CULT On the eve of his controversial departure from Chongqing in December 1938 and at the start of his peace negotiations with the Japanese, the Nationalist Chinese premier Wang Jingwei had been witness to and involved in the creation of Republican Chinese leadership cults for as long as any living politician. A protégé of Sun Yat-sen in the 1910s, Wang had been one of the most enthusiastic architects of the Sun cult (having helped draft Sun's political testament, for instance,).24 As a career revolutionary, Wang had also been the focus of celebration by sections of the Kuomintang. In the late 1920s, for example, he had been the object of adulation from that party's "Reorganization Faction" led by Chen Gongbo, which had openly called for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek. 25 Wang has even been described as having been a sex symbol in prewar China, and he was certainly famed for his charisma and looks. This highly unusual context influenced the organic fashion in which Wang began to be promoted in early 1939, by both the Japanese and Chinese members of the "peace movement" around him. One can point to no single date as the "start" of the wartime Wang personality cult, and no set of rules was published that either group was expected to adhere to. It is nonetheless significant that Wang's promotion as an alternative to Chiang began more than a year before his regime was officially inaugurated. It thus developed with no formalized set of regulations concerning how Wang was to be pictured or even referred to, and the result was a polyphonic and Very different images of Wang were being developed at this time. Anonymous propaganda leaflets, also produced that January and seemingly distributed by the Japanese army, included a portrait of a sober and pensive Wang alongside texts authored by him calling for peace. Such propaganda drew on historical references from Chinese antiquity and was couched in a far softer rhetoric, which called on the KMT to "seriously reflect" (fanxing) on its decision to continue with resistance.31
More subtle promotion of Wang was found in pro-Wang editorials published in newspapers managed by Lin Bosheng. It was through newspapers such as the Central China Daily News that "the noble personality of Wang and his followers, who sustained nationwide condemnation and worked for the peace movement without personal benefit" began to appear with some regularity in early 1939. 32 The narrative that emerged in the pro-Wang press in these early months embraced the very controversy of Wang's decision to even speak with the Japanese. It deployed this act as evidence of Wang's spirit of self-sacrifice, while always casting a pacifist, patriotic, and anti-communist Wang as the antithesis of Chiang.33 As Andrew Cheung has observed, the key distinction made by individuals such as Lin was that Wang was a "constitutional leader" (and an upholder of the Republican government) in contrast to Chiang Kai-shek, the dictator.34 CSSH 57-3 Taylor 10 Many regimes had faced the problem of legitimizing "puppet leaders" prior to the foundation of the RNG, and so there were a number of precedents that Wang and his followers might have drawn upon in this early period when trying to establish a credible public persona for their leader.
In Soviet-occupied Xinjiang, a personality cult had been built around the Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai, who ruled with Soviet backing from the mid-1930s onward. It was based on the myth of equality between Sheng and Josef Stalin, with "huge portraits" of both men decorating public spaces in the province. 35 Similarly, the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China," which had been (re)established in occupied north China in 1938, had worked hard to promote of its nominal leader, Wang Kemin. Wang became the object of scorn in the Western press, yet his short-lived regime produced images in posters and leaflets of a gargantuan Wang towering over the "north Chinese" masses as they waved the five-colored flag of the provisional government, in an attempt to instill loyalty to the unaccomplished nationalist bureaucrat.36
Over the course of 1939, the promotion of Wang Jingwei progressed in quite different fashion.
There appears to have been a deliberate effort to avoid mistakes associated with the promotions of these earlier "client regimes," and specifically to ensure that Wang Jingwei did not become "another Wang Kemin."37 For this reason, his Chinese supporters were given significant autonomy in encouraging public adulation of their hero. Some American observers noted that Wang "and his cohorts" had "stolen the show" from the Japanese by virtue of their far keener understanding of their Chinese audience.38 Nonetheless, Wang's Chinese courtiers could not claim complete control over his image, since prior to March 1940 no single person, agency, or group was charged with managing his promotion. As a result, one finds Wang's name and image being used in laissez-faire fashion in the lead up to March 1940. He was presented as a militant revolutionary by one source, only to appear as "cute and cuddly," or manga-esque in another.
Unusually for a mid-twentieth-century Chinese leader, Wang was in early 1940 even used to CSSH 57-3 Taylor 11 market medicinal products.39 CONTRADISTINCTION AND THE WANG CULT David P. Barrett has argued that Wang Jingwei's RNG was unique among modern Chinese regimes in its efforts to highlight its continuities with the government it sought to replace, inheriting many of the same symbols and policies the Nationalist state had developed in the Nanjing years.40 Margherita Zanasi has similarly described the collaborationists' ability to resurrect Republican Chinese iconography under Japanese domination as a political victory on the part of Wang Jingwei. 41 The RNG certainly did derive much of its rhetoric, and even its name, from particular strands of prewar Republican nationalism, most noticeably the Reorganized Faction within the KMT. Wang and others who followed him back to Nanjing in 1940 had belonged to that faction, and so it was no coincidence that his wartime regime adopted a similar (yonghu Wang Zhuxi), "follow the leader" (fucong lingxiu), and submit to the will of their "supreme leader," (zuigao lingxiu) just as those in "Free China" had done for Chiang Kai-shek. 43 Collections of Wang's speeches were edited on the model of those crafted around Chiang in 1938-1939. His portraits were distributed both internally and to parts of occupied Asia,44 where members of diasporic Chinese communities were expected to hang them in public and make a show of their hatred for Chiang Kai-shek while doing so. 45 In the centrality of Wang to his regime, the RNG looked like not only the Chinese government CSSH 57-3 Taylor 12 it had replaced but also other "client states" that predated it (though in other ways those regimes were very different). For instance, recent work on propaganda produced in the Japanese-sponsored Manchukuo has shown that the "Manchurian emperor" Puyi was the only identifiable "character" in wartime documentaries "otherwise populated by collective heroes."46 As would occur with Wang Jingwei, state propaganda organs in Manchukuo promoted Puyi as the living embodiment of a state ideology, "the concrete expression of the spiritual foundation" of "the Kingly Way" (Wang dao). 47 Tellingly, the celebration of Wang as part of the inauguration of the RNG was derivative of, but also defined directly against, the early wartime cult of Chiang Kai-shek. Although some of the methods the RNG utilized resembled Nationalist adulation of Chiang in Chongqing, the promotion's content differed noticeably, as did the extent to which such adulation was expressed.
As Andrew Cheung has noted, this meant casting Chiang as a "dictator" while praising Wang as a symbol of constitutionalism. RNG propaganda was founded on a seemingly counterintuitive logic that Wang deserved praise precisely because he did not seek it.
While a focus on constitutionalism and public self-effacement were consistent with earlier propaganda built around Wang by his supporters within the KMT, and particularly by the party's Reorganization Faction, the RNG consciously used the same approach to accentuate Wang's differences with Chiang in wartime. Lin Bosheng phrased this distinction at the first RNG propaganda conference in the summer of 1941, when he reminded his staff that "we need to overthrow the politics of individual dictators [i.e., Chiang Kai-shek]," because, "outwardly such people call on the need for centralized rule, but in reality they are simply dictators, who have never had any concern for the ordinary people." Wang was presented in contrast, as a selfless leader who was fully aware of the risk he was taking in choosing to "collaborate," but did so anyway to keep China intact.48 CSSH 57-3 Taylor 13 In this regard, the Wang cult shared much with Pétainism in occupied France. Despite their differences, both Marshall Pétain and Wang Jingwei were marketed by those around them with an obsessive attention to their centrality in national politics and their association with Republican ideals. In both cases also, there was an important attempt to emphasize continuities between their legitimacy pre-and post-invasion. Both men were praised for their willingness to serve rather than any inherent power or greatness. In occupied France, this meant presenting Petain as "reluctant martyr rather than incipient dictator."49 For hagiographers such as Lin Bosheng, it meant drawing a clear line between dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek and "Mr Wang [whose] desire to love and protect his country is without precedent."50
Much effort was put into encouraging contradistinction between Wang and Chiang on precisely this latter point. In internal directives on propaganda, for example, RNG bureaucrats were encouraged to cast Wang with Chiang as direct opposites: "We should make a distinction (liang xiang duibi) between the Nationalist Government [i.e., the RNG], which loves and protects the people, and Chongqing, which sacrifices the people. This will enable the people to realize who is their protector, and who is their enemy."
This was also communicated in the visual realm. At the most basic level, imagery created around Wang in early 1940 stressed his civilian credentials: official portraits (produced by, significantly, private studios rather than state photographers) showed Wang in a tailored suit, in clear contrast to the always-uniformed Chiang. In public Wang appeared in a full array of civilian costumes: a dark tailored suit, a white linen suit, a Chinese scholar's gown, or, on official occasions, a morning suit (figure 6).51 Wang's full head of hair was no more manufactured than was Chiang Kai-shek's close cropped, military-style haircut, yet much was made of their differences in grooming. In early RNG photography, Wang's hair was always immaculately oiled and combed, while in graphic art the fullness of his hair was accentuated. Both Japanese and RNG CSSH 57-3 Taylor 14 propagandists made much of Chiang Kai-shek's apparent baldness, believed to be a symptom of his lack of virility ( figure 7) . In all of this, the RNG drew on a longstanding public image of Wang, which had been fostered by his followers within the prewar KMT, as a man of "consummate elegance and taste."52 In the context of the Second Sino-Japanese War, this narrative was highlighted to contrast Wang with the ever-uniformed Chiang.
Though Wang was frequently presented in oratorical poses, as Chiang had been, he was usually pictured in far less aggressive mode than Chiang, and he often wore a smile.53 Official portraits of Chiang in this early phase of the war showed the generalissimo gazing into the distance, but Wang's eyes often looked directly at the viewer, which harkened back to prewar Sun Yat-sen iconography. Much was also made of the two men's distinct speech differences. Despite Cantonese intonations, Wang spoke in a Mandarin that was far closer to what today would be termed standard "putonghua" rather than the Ningbo-laden Chinese identified with Chiang. This is one reason Wang's voice was used more often in official RNG broadcasting than was Chiang's in Chongqing.
Even Wang's status as husband and father was promoted in very different ways from Chiang's. Chiang Kai-shek's government gave much attention to his English-speaking wife, and the promotion of Madame Chiang as a maternal protector of Chinese soldiers was a mainstay of Nationalist propaganda early in the war.54 Axis propaganda besmirched Chiang for this same reason, however, presenting him as a hen-pecked husband or the partner of a coquette. It is therefore noteworthy that Wang Jingwei's wife Chen Bijun-an accomplished Republican activist in her own right-was nearly absent from RNG visual propaganda except for occasional references to her in the print media.
While the RNG constructed a markedly different story around Wang through visual imagery, it also distinguished itself from the Chiang "dictatorship" by distancing itself from the more CSSH 57-3 Taylor 15 extreme forms of leader worship that had characterized KMT political culture during the Nanjing years. A standard feature of both the Sun and Chiang personality cults, for instance, had been naming public institutions or thoroughfares after them. It is thus noteworthy that no streets or institutions were given Wang's name under the RNG, and thoroughfares that had been named in honor of Chiang prior to 1937 were not renamed after Wang. Even when Japanese occupiers removed Sun Yat-sen's name from public spaces in cities such as Xiamen, they did not replace it with Wang's. 55 Wang also refrained from lavishly celebrating his birthday, in contrast to Chiang, whose birthdays in the 1930s had been marked by public expressions of adulation. Nor was the long-term prospects for the RNG itself.58 Be that as it may, the result was a far subtler and less visually dominating cult than that promulgated around Chiang in Nanjing or after the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out. The only statues of Wang erected during the war were some created hastily in Chongqing so as to allow city residents to spit on this "traitor" in absentia. 59 What all of this suggests is that the RNG propaganda appeals to constitutionalism were more than mere rhetoric, and served to highlight continuities between the RNG and the "Reorganized" tradition within the KMT, at least at the regime's outset. Here it is instructive to compare the CSSH 57-3 Taylor 16 regulatory regimes surrounding representations of Chiang Kai-shek in Nationalist territory with laws introduced from March 1940 onward regarding representations of Wang Jingwei. A key feature was that the RNG did not proscribe how Wang was to be represented. To be sure, Lin Bosheng and his cadres were keen to present a particular narrative that stressed Wang's supposed selflessness. In RNG law, however, it was the position of "Chairman of the National Government,"rather than the individual who occupied it, which was held in greatest esteem, and this determined how a person was to be treated or spoken to. While Wang's public calls for Lin Chiang precisely because he had physically "returned to the capital (huandu)." Nanjing had been redesigned for Sun in the 1920s as an urban monument writ large, and the RNG's preoccupation with the city and its use it in the construction of the Wang cult, expressed above all a desire to stress Wang's symbolic connections with Sun.71 Even here elements of contradistinction can be found, however. Rudolf Wagner has shown that Wang's wartime possession of Nanjing, and the mausoleum therein, were insufficient: The RNG "needed a very particular marker to set it off against Chiang Kai-shek's." It found this in the form of Sun Yat-sen's CSSH 57-3 Taylor 19 preserved entrails, which had been left in Beijing after his death and the RNG now relocated to Nanjing among much pomp. Wang's ability to reconstitute Sun's physical body in Nanjing during the war years was premised on RNG propaganda-Sun's "sacred entrails" were worked into RNG political ritual-and set his regime apart from a government that had chosen not to relocate Sun's body to the interior when it fled the national capital in December 1937.72 In RNG hagiography, Photographs of Wang in military uniform were being distributed through the RNG press as early as 1941. The "rural pacification" (qingxiang) campaigns that the RNG had instituted that year had often been documented with images of Wang dressed in a field uniform inspecting the CSSH 57-3 Taylor 20 progress of attempts to root out underground resistance organizations. In his role as nominal head of state, Wang had also partaken in military parades (yuebing), dressed in formal military attire, and sometimes wearing a uniform, at times while being photographed in front of civilian portraits of himself. While such martial images were at odds with the far more common narrative of Wang as a civilian leader, their association with anti-resistance campaigns meant they did not necessarily undermine the wider appeals to pacifism inherent in the Wang cult.
Official RNG publications produced after the Pearl Harbor attack, however, reveal new discursive problems the RNG faced when promoting its leader in a war that now pitted its protector For the Chongqing Nationalists, Pearl Harbor quickly generated a new, unprecedented international angle to their leader's profile, and the shift that followed also brought access to news media, technologies, and techniques that had previously been scant. As a result, the image of That December, regulations were put in place to control the production of portraits and sculptures of Chiang and Sun Yat-sen by non-governmental individuals in "Free China." These rules, far more extensive than any introduced previously by either Chiang's government or the RNG, included requirements that artists submit detailed plans of their work to the Ministry of Propaganda for approval before completing or distributing them. The artists also had to submit extensive information about themselves.89
The shifting dynamics of the war after Pearl Harbor thus turned the Wang-Chiang binary on its head. A new network of allegiances engendered when World War II came to China led directly to the transformation of Chiang's China from a stand-alone enemy of Japan to a member of the "big four" and a subsequent reinvention of Chiang's public image both within China and abroad.
For the RNG, it prompted a confused and hurried attempt to carve out a symbolic space for its leader within the Axis bloc, which drew on a full array of authoritarian propaganda that it had previously been so keen to avoid.
CONCLUSION: PERSONALITY CULTS UNDER OCCUPATION
For much of their political careers, both before and during the war against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei sought to present themselves in vastly different ways. During the war years, Wang acquired a centralized propaganda apparatus and staff that enabled him to challenge Chiang's preeminence. But the origins of his wartime cult, and the far more amorphous way in which it was promulgated, generated often-conflicting portrayals and views of who Wang was and what he stood for.
Examining the wartime Wang cult at its height in March 1940, we find that Wang took on an unusual glow in the pantheon of Second World War leaders. In seeking to employ the standard methods of leader worship available in Republican China, and at the same time to write an original "story" about their leader, RNG propagandists succeeded in producing a personality cult that, CSSH 57-3 Taylor 25 through most of its existence, avoided the excesses of leader worship being promoted in "Free China." Wang was not a democratic leader, but his promotion in occupied China was far more modest and open to individual interpretation than was the strictly controlled promotion of Chiang Kai-shek. As I have shown, this was a key element of the RNG argument, for its central aim in creating the cult was to set Wang apart from Chiang in both form and intent.
The competition between these two rival Republican Chinese cults can teach us much about the worship of "great men" under regimes of occupation. Much of the general literature on personality cults notes the tendency toward veneration of heroic leaders as a form of "symbolic legitimation" in states beset by "social conflict," or "where there is low consensus on ideological and programmatic goals," often corresponding with times of war.90 There has been less study of the peculiar circumstances that confront regimes built around "great men" in the shadow of an occupying power, even though Asia and Europe saw many such regimes come and go during in the course of the twentieth century. Too often, attachment of the label "collaborator" to such regimes has resulted in their being deemed unworthy of serious study.
The Wang cult highlights the problems inherent in balancing a national and supposedly autonomous political movement with the ever changing political needs of an occupying power.
Here the fate of the Wang cult falls into a pattern common to many "client regimes," including those in vastly different geographic contexts. Germany would take in 1945, and particularly about how such a hypothetical state would reconcile German political traditions with the process of "Sovietization," led to several conflicts over who loyal East German socialists should promote as their heroes and how to go about such promotion.
In the early years of the Soviet occupation, East German communists were able to promote their own leaders, such as Wilhelm Pieck, often at the expense of the Soviets, and they avoided large-scale emulation of the Stalin cult. Just as the "peace movement" stressed Wang's Chineseness, these early postwar communists sought to emphasize their autonomy by promoting distinctly German heroes under the early period of Soviet occupation, while balancing this with the reality of Soviet power. Similarly, and as with occupied China in the lead-up to and just after the creation of the RNG, they were able to do so because of an "absence of a system of centralized control over visual agitation" in the years just before the founding of the GDR. 91 In both cases, a general confusion that characterized the early stage of occupation, and a lack of agreement about what the occupation would develop into, led to the rise of short-lived personality cults authored almost exclusively by Germans and Chinese, respectively. In East Germany, this continued until large-scale Sovietization in 1949; in Wang's RNG, it was undermined by events that followed the Pearl Harbor attack and the confused messages that attack produced in RNG propaganda from 1941 onward. In both cases, the changing context of occupation undermined the consistency of the message.
Only in recent years has the Wang Jingwei personality cult has been taken seriously as a subject of academic inquiry. Like the RNG itself, it has often been dismissed as nothing more than the detritus of Japanese militarism. The postwar dismantling of the Wang cult was made easier, ironically, by the RNG's avoidance of widespread architectural, sculptural, or nomenclatural references to its leader, and this also contributed to its erasure from public memory in China.92 Study of the regime is also hindered by a dearth of archival evidence that was left in Japan at the CSSH 57-3 Taylor 27 end of the Second World War, and more recently by the indefinite closure of Number Two Historical Archives in Nanjing, which holds many important sources for studying the RNG. I hope this institution will eventually reopen, and enable others to test the arguments I make in this paper.
The Wang cult deserves to be studied for more than what it says about wartime China. In its contradistinction from the Nationalist promotion of Chiang Kai-shek, its development in the absence of a state propaganda framework, and in the ultimately contradictory messages that it came to promote, the Wang Jingwei personality cult offers a window into political cultures that develop under the rubric of collaboration.
CSSH 57-3 Taylor 28 Abstract: This paper explores the development of the Wang Jingwei personality cult during the Japanese occupation of China (1937 China ( -1945 . It examines how the collaborationist Chinese state led by Wang sought to distinguish its figurehead from the person he had replaced, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Drawing on visual, archival, and published sources, it traces the development of the Wang cult from the early years of the war, and argues that the unusual context in which the cult evolved ultimately undermined its coherence. The case of Wang Jingwei illustrates how the Chinese case more broadly can enhance our understandings of personality cults that develop under occupation. To this end, I compare the Wang regime with various European "collaborationist" governments that sought to promote their leaders in similar ways.
